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ALCOHOLISM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
POWELL v. TEXAS'
Over two million Americans will be arrested this year. One third of
those arrested will be charged with public drunkenness and sentenced to
punishments ranging from fines to incarceration.2  Many of those punished
for drunkenness will be suffering from the disease of dipsomania. American
medical authorities estimate that over four million Americans suffer from
this disease, better known as chronic alcoholism. 3
The problem of the chronic alcoholic has been the subject of social and
medical concern for years, but to date no effective cure has been developed.
In the streets of our large urban centers, one can find the tragic evidence of
the effects of alcoholism. For too many so afflicted, the only treatment
administered is arrest. Is such treatment cruel and unusual punishment?
In Robinson v. California4 the United States Supreme Court did not deal
with the disease of alcoholism, but it was directly concerned with the simi-
lar problem of drug addiction. The Court decided that the defendant could
not be punished for his status as a drug addict because drug addiction was
a disease. The Court based its decision on the principle that it would be
"cruel and unusual" to punish someone for an unavoidable status, thereby
holding that the Eighth Amendment 5 prevented punishing a person for
being sick.
The parallel between alcoholism and drug addiction was quickly recog-
nized by the legal profession, and defenses based on the Robinson case
were raised against charges of public drunkenness when the defendant was
a habitual alcoholic. By 1966 the issue of Eighth Amendment protection
for chronic alcoholics reached the federal courts of appeals in the cases of
Driver v. Hinnant0 and Easter v. District of Columbia.
7
In the Driver case the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that an alcoholic is an "addict" and that alcoholism is universally
recognized as a disease. Inasmuch as the defendant was in an intoxicated
condition caused by a compulsion which was symptomatic of the disease,
1 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FoRcE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 1 (1967).
3 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 527 (1968).
4 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
6 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
7 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the court ruled that on the basis of Robinson the State could not punish the
defendant. The Driver court paid particular attention to the fact that the
defendant was without money or restraining care and therefore could not
avoid being drunk in public. The streets were the dwelling place of Mr.
Driver. Impliedly, his presence in public was not an act separate from his
intoxication, but was an integral part of that intoxication.
In the Easter case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that the compulsion to drink was involuntary, thereby destroying the
mens rea requirement necessary for conviction. At the same time, the
court expressly stated that the defense is not one of insanity but rather of
sickness which results in a loss of control over the use of alcohol. The
Easter court specifically mentioned that the lack of facilities for treating
alcoholics was not to be considered when deciding whether the chronic
alcoholic had committed a crime by being drunk in public.
In 1967 the impact of the Driver-Easter cases was felt in the state courts.
California considered the Driver-Easter reasoning in People v. Spinks.8 The
Robinson case was distinguished on the basis that the defendant Spinks was
being punished for the act of being disorderly and not for the status of be-
ing drunk. The Driver case was distinguished on the grounds that Mr.
Spinks had failed to prove that he could not control his drinking or his
presence in public. The issue of mens rea was not determined in the
Spinks case because the defendant pleaded guilty, thereby admitting intent.
Mr. Spinks's writ of habeas corpus was denied, and the Driver-Easter de-
fense was held not to apply.
In People v. Hoy9 Michigan also rejected the Driver-Easter reasoning.
The Michigan court ruled that there is a distinction between being drunk, as
a status, and being drunk in public. Thus, being drunk in public is the
status of intoxication plus an act. The court could not punish the defendant
for being in public, but only for being drunk in public. Once again the de-
fendant did not produce sufficient evidence to support his allegation that
his compulsion to drink was uncontrollable. 10
All attempts to employ the Driver-Easter rationale as a defense to such
serious crimes as murder, robbery, and assault were rejected." The state
courts which considered the problem agreed that such serious crimes were
not compulsive symptoms of the disease of alcoholism and, therefore, that
intoxication did not destroy the mens rea necessary for conviction of these
crimes.
These state cases readily show that Robinson will neither be extended to
8 253 Cal. App. 2d 748, 61 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1967).
9 380 Mich. 597, 158 N.W.2d 436 (1968).
10 See also Seattle v. Hill, - Wash. -, 435 P.2d 692 (1967).
11 People v. Wilson, - Cal. App. 2d -, 67 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1968); Prather v.
Warden, 1 Md. App. 78, 231 A.2d 726 (1967); Dubs v. State, 2 Md. App. 524, 235
A.2d 764 (1967).
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alcoholic defendants who cannot prove that their drinking was compulsive
nor to cases where the court distinguishes between an act and a status. In
Driver and Easter these obstacles were overcome by expert testimony as to
the volition of the defendant's conduct and as to the fact that if an act is
caused by a compulsive symptom of the disease, it is part of the disease
and not a separate element.
By 1968 the dichotomy between the federal courts of appeals and the
state courts required resolution. The time had arrived for the United States
Supreme Court to decide whether the Robinson case applied to alcoholics
and whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishing an alcoholic for
being drunk in public. Whether the State can punish a chronic alcoholic for
public drunkenness was questioned for the first time before the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Texas.1 2 Since 1949 Leroy Powell had been convicted
of public intoxication approximately 100 times. Working at a tavern shin-
ing shoes, Powell spent his $12-per-week earnings almost exclusively on
wine. He had a family to whom he contributed no support. He drank every
day, became inebriated about once a week, and as a result usually slept in
public places, such as the sidewalk.
In December of 1966 Powell was arrested and charged with violation of a
Texas statute prohibiting publc drunkenness, which reads:
Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public
place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one
hundred dollars.18
Powell was subsequently tried and found guilty. The trial judge made the
following findings of fact:
1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted person's
will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol.
2) That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition but
under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism.
3) That Leroy Powell, a defendant herein, is a chronic alcoholic who is
afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism.14
Upon these findings he ruled that as a matter of law chronic alcoholism was
not a defense to the charge. Either such a finding was specifically designed
to force this case into the Supreme Court, as Justice Marshall suggests, or
the Texas court apparently did not appreciate the significance of these
"facts." Powell appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The central issue in Powell was whether or not compulsion may be a de-
fense to the Texas statute. In a five-to-four opinion of the Court, Justice
White concurring in the result, the Supreme Court held that Powell's alco-
holism was not a good defense. However, the outcome in Powell is not
necessarily determinative as is shown by carefully contrasting the Court's
12 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
13 Vernon's Ann. Texas Penal Code art. 477 (1952).
14 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521 (1968).
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language in the concurring and dissenting opinions with that of the ma-
jority. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Marshall and joined in
by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Harlan, states that the
problem of alcoholism is still too vague and uncertain to be used as a legal
defense. Justice Marshall was specifically concerned that the medical pro-
fession offers no guidelines for establishing the point at which one can no
longer control his compulsion to drink. Doctors cannot even determine with
certainty whether the disease of alcholism is physiologically or psychologi-
cally based. Justice Marshall indicated that until such a determination is
made, the Court cannot accept Powell's argument, since accepting it would
create great uncertainty in the law.
Such an uncertainty arises out of the necessity to determine the strength
of a compulsion when medical experts disagree upon this very fact. Upon
such insecure knowledge, the Court did not wish to resolve the dilemma by
recognizing the validity of Powell's defense. The defendant produced one
expert witness who testified that Powell suffered from a "compulsion" to
drink, but that this compulsion was not completely overpowering. In the
Court's eyes, this was not sufficient to prove that the afflicted person's will-
power was destroyed. Justice Marshall was concerned about the sufficiency
of the proof because the "compulsion" would imply some resistance, however
futile, on the part of the defendant, whereas the overpowering compulsion
would not. The defendant's failure to clearly prove which type of compul-
sion existed prevented the Court from excusing the resulting acts as being
symptomatically linked to the disease. The compulsion might as easily be
the product of the defendant's own volition, in which case he would be
punishable.
Also of concern to Justice Marshall was the lack of an alternative method
of dealing with public drunks. The Justice recognized the power of the
State to regulate conduct for the welfare of its citizens and was of the opinion
that in the absence of some alternative system of care, the current method
of arrest and subsequent imprisonment or fine fulfilled the duties of the
State to its citizens. It also had a small therapeutic value upon the alco-
holic because it subjected him to a "drying out" process on a periodic basis.
While evidentiary problems and public welfare were important consid-
erations in this decision, the Court's discussion of the Eighth Amendment's
and specifically of the Robinson case was of primary concern. Did the
Robinson case proscribe the State from punishing for a compulsion or did
Robinson mean that the State could not punish the mere status of addiction?
To answer this question Justice Marshall proceeded to distinguish the case
before him from Robinson by differentiating between a status and an act
arising out of a condition. For purposes of this note, "status," "condi-
tion" and "act" take on specific meanings. The Justices defined these
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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terms differently within the various opinions. Despite the conflicting usage
of these terms we define "condition" as intoxication. "Status," on the other
hand, is defined as the disease of chronic alcoholism. The "act" is that of
being in public.16 Robinson was convicted under a California statute 7
which proscribed the status of being addicted to narcotics and provided for
imprisonment. The Court analogized that "even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common
cold."' 8 As a cold is a mere status that one cannot escape, so too is drug
addiction. Powell, on the other hand, suffered from the condition of intoxi-
cation, which compelled certain acts in violation of the Penal Code. A con-
dition, therefore, which causes one to violate the statute is not the same as
a status which is a violation of the statute. Justice Marshall ruled that
Robinson applied only to the punishment of a status and therefore did not
apply to a law which punished an act arising out of a condition. No effort
was made to analyze the concept that while drunk, the defendant was un-
able to avoid being in public, so that the crime was really one of status only.
The Driver-Easter cases had raised the issue that the compulsion to drink
would destroy the necessary mens rea element. The issue was raised again
in the Powell case. Justice Marshall noted the problem and responded to it
by saying that if the Supreme Court accepted the Driver-Easter reasoning,
it would be forcing the "irresistible impulse" rule on all courts. The opin-
ion states that this "irresistible impulse" defense was not widely accepted in
the state courts and that the United States Supreme Court was not prepared
to impose such a defense under the Constitution.
Justice Marshall did not deny that Powell's defense would, if recognized,
destroy the mens rea element of the crime. Instead, the issue was subordi-
nated to State interests, and any attempted solution was deliberately avoided.
The issue of mens rea was left to Justice White and the dissent
to analyze. Such arguments relating to moral responsibility and
mens rea closely overlap with the Court's reluctance to proclaim an insanity
test in constitutional terms.' 9 Such formulation would "freeze the develop-
ing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitu-
tional mold.120 This mold, based upon the vague provisions of the Eighth
Amendment, 2 ' would compel a difficult and unrealistic application of the
16 See 392 U.S. 514, 550-51 n.2 (1968), where Justice White appears to equate
status and condition.
'7 CA.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1964).
18 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 667 (1962).
19 The word "reluctance" is used instead of "refusal" because the authors assume
that insanity will inevitably be raised to a constitutional level.
20 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968).
21 See Kirschgessner v. State, 174 Md. 195, 198 A. 271 (1938), where the court
regarded such a clause as merely "advisory" since there was no fixed standard. See
generally Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment
Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. Rrv. 996 (1964).
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Amendment, thereby burdening every town, city, and state in the nation.
As the medical profession cannot define the problem of alcoholism with
certainty, so too the legal profession cannot clearly define a test for insanity.
In this regard Justice Marshall has not closed the door on a defense of
chronic alcoholism. Implicit in the opinion is the concept that when the
medical profession is able to determine the characteristics of the disease with
precision or when some suitable alternative basis for dealing with the prob-
lem is available, the Court might consider the question again. Until that
time Justice Marshall believes that arrest and confinement are the only
practical solutions and that "it is difficult to say in the present context that
the criminal process is utterly lacking in social value."
'22
The concurring opinion by Justice Black, in which Justice Harlan joins, is
a vigorous reiteration of the majority opinion. In reference to the status-act
distinction, Justice Black also added that the Robinson case was limited to
punishing status only and did not protect behavior patterns. Both Justices
were alarmed that if they allowed the Robinson rule to cover behavioral ac-
tion, it would soon be expanded to protect the addict from being arrested for
the act of using narcotics. The Court would not accept such an extension.
The most significant opinion in Powell is that written by Justice White.
Concurring in the result, Justice White agreed with the argument that an
alcoholic could not be convicted for being drunk. He based his opinion,
however, on the fact that Powell was convicted for being intoxicated in a
public place. There was no showing at the trial to support the contention
that Powell had a compulsion to be drunk in public. The record showed
that the defendant had a home and a job, indicating that he had some con-
trol over his movements and could have chosen to be drunk in private.
Justice White suggested two possible situations where chronic alcoholism
would be a good defense. First, if one becomes drunk in private so that
he loses the ability to control his movements and thus appears in public, the
Eighth Amendment might forbid a conviction if it were not feasible to make
arrangements to prevent a public appearance. If the alcoholic has no
choice but to drink and be drunk in public, then a law punishing that alco-
holic for being drunk in public is in fact punishing the defendant for an una-
voidable consequence of his status. There is no act because an act implies
volition. If his public presence is involuntary, the status-condition-act dis-
tinction is unnecessary.
The second and more important situation is really an express example of
an involuntary public appearance. Justice White left the way clear for pos-
sible application of the Robinson rule in cases of indigent alcoholics who
live in alleys and streets and traditionally beg for money to buy their drinks.
The defendant in the Driver case had been convicted on more than two
hundred occasions for public drunkenness. The district court specifically
22 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968).
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noted that he was without money or restraining care. It seems that under
Justice White's view, the indigent alcoholic in Driver could be protected by
the Robinson rule. Great significance attaches to Justice White's opinion,
since many alcoholics are in fact indigent.23
Under the two situations which would allow a defense, the real issue is
one of mens rea. The defendant's condition of intoxication operates to de-
stroy the necessary intent to be in public. If the defendant lacks the in-
tent to appear in public, conviction would be denied without the neccessity
of determining the status-condition-act relationship. In other words, if Pow-
ell could have shown that he involuntarily appeared in public, his resulting lack
of mens rea would have sustained a defense without raising the constitutional
issue. This was the precise problem Justice Marshall managed to avoid.
The significance of Justice White's opinion and the fine distinctions he
drew2 4 lend import to the dissent. Written by Justice Fortas, with Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart concurring, the dissent argued that
Powell's case falls within the rule of Robinson. Justice Fortas explained
that the Robinson case applied to a person's condition as well as his status.
Powell was powerless to change his condition or avoid his status because his
status as an alcoholic was the source of the compulsion and the compulsion
resulted in the condition necessary for conviction of the crime. It is interest-
ing to note that Justice White, in his description of the indigent alcoholic,
also advocated a defense based upon helplessness. This reasoning logically
extends to the conclusion that the conviction of an alcoholic for drunken-
ness actually results in a conviction for the status of being an alcoholic.
Such a conviction is prohibited by an extension of the Robinson interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment. The dissent denied that imprisonment is
in any way therapeutic and succinctly stated that imprisonment is unques-
tionably a purely punitive measure.
The importance of the Powell case rests not upon what the Court said the
state could punish, but upon what the Court said might be considered a
violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Robinson. Four mem-
bers of the so-called majority are convinced that the size of the problem
and the lack of alternative remedies are at this time too great to allow such
an all-encompassing change. The importance of this finding is accentuated
by Justice White's concurring opinion. All five of the majority Justices
agree in principle. That is, if a person suffers from a compulsion that is
symptomatic of a disease and the law punishes for that compulsion, such
punishment would violate the Eighth Amendment. All five Justices also
agree that the record in the Powell case was insufficient to show that such a
compulsion existed. Indeed, only one psychiatrist testified for the defend-
23 Id. at 551.
24 In Robinson, Justice White dissented on the basis of another fine distinction. The
statute could be construed as a conviction against regular and repeated use of narcotics,
an act for which Robinson could and should be held criminally liable.
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ant. Powell admitted on the stand that he had control over his drinking in
that he could limit himself to only one drink. It must also be noted that
the arrest record was not sufficiently detailed to show that at the time of
arrest, the defendant was unable to avoid being in public.
It is at this point that Justice White departed from the reasoning of the
other Justices in the majority. He argued that the medical profession pos-
sesses sufficient knowledge to diagnose chronic alcoholism with legal clarity.
The main issue, according to Justice White, was whether the compulsion was
overpowering. Either the alcoholic involuntarily drinks in public because of
his indigent status, or he becomes intoxicated and is unable to make arrange-
ments to avoid being in public.
Because of the split in Powell, Justice White's concurring opinion is the
harbinger of good fortune to the "skid row drunk." The Eighth Amendment
may still protect an indigent alcoholic. The Justice expressly stated that the
Texas statute as applied to indigent alcoholics "is in effect a law which bans
a single act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amend-
ment-the act of getting drunk, '25 which would include appearance in
public.
The extent to which an alcoholic is compelled to drink will still be a
matter for the medical profession to define. Expert testimony will be
essential in establishing the defendant's psychological make-up in relation to
his history and plight. The same reasoning that applies to the indigent al-
coholic is also applicable to the alcoholic who becomes drunk and then does
not realize that he has entered the public streets. Clearly this protection
would have very limited application because almost anyone could make
arrangements in advance if he has a family or a home.
The Powell case still condones the Driver-Easter reasoning but on a much
more limited basis. Because of the split in Powell, Justice White indicated
that expert medical testimony may be accepted by the court to establish the
necessary compulsion, thereby preventing the conviction of an alcoholic un-
der the reasoning of the Driver case when Justice White's other requirements
are met. Evidence will be necessary to show the defendant's indigency or his
inability to make provisions to avoid being in public before the compulsion
strikes. The arrest record should also clearly show the defendant's condition
at the time of arrest since such evidence would be used by the experts as an
aid in proving the extent of the compulsion.
The mens rea reasoning found in the Easter case has been specifically
rejected by Justice Marshall. However, it still exists sub silentio in Justice
White's opinion. Justice White stated that a showing of an inability to avoid
being in public might prevent a conviction. Such reasoning is directed at
intent, which is the mnens rea issue. Still, the mens rea issue is unsettled with
reference to public drunkenness. Easter held that the compulsion would
25 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968).
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destroy the mens rea regarding intoxication. On the other hand, Justice
White announced that the socio-economic status of the defendant might de-
stroy the mens rea necessary for the act of being in public. Either theory,
if accepted by the four dissenting Justices in Powell, would prevent con-
viction.
By concurring in the result only, Justice White prevented the Court from
clearly responding to the issues raised by the Driver and Easter cases. Le-
roy Powell cannot be protected, yet the Eighth Amendment may still pro-
tect alcoholics in certain limited situations as it does narcotic addicts.
The attorney representing an indigent alcoholic still has an Eighth Amend-
ment defense available if sufficient expert testimony can be obtained, and
he should argue the mens rea issue. Powell has not totally denied either
defense.26
Wayne W. Armstrong
Perry S. Silver
26 The trend toward protecting the indigent might also be extended into other areas.
Since the protections of the Eighth Amendment direct themselves to the effect of sen-
tencing and not specifically to the statute itself, the indigent misdemeanant who is faced
with either paying a fine or being imprisoned might have a successful defense. If he
could show that his indigency is symptomatic of a psychological disturbance and that
his predicament is beyond his control, Powell may serve as persuasive authority for his
protection.
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